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 A. The bilateral trade relationship 
The EU and the US are each other’s most important trading partners with the 
largest bilateral trade and investment relationship in the world. In the area of trade, 
the US is the largest trading partner for the EU, while the EU is the second largest 
trading partner for the US after Canada and before Mexico. In 2003, around 26% of 
total EU exports went to the US (226 billion dollars), while 17% of total EU imports 
came from the US (157 billion dollars). 
EU merchandize trade with the US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/html/113465.htm 
 
The bilateral investment relationship is even more significant: the EU and the US 
are by far the most important source and destination for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) for each other. Between 1998 and 2001 the share of EU FDI outflows to the 
US accounted for more than 52% of total EU investment, while more than 61% of all 
EU FDI inflows originated in the US. In 2003, the EU investment position in the US 
amounted to 856 billion dollars, while total US FDI in the EU accounted for 845 
billion dollars. Another important link of the transatlantic economy are foreign affili-
ate sales which amounted to 2.8 trillion dollars in 2001, more than five times the total 
bilateral trade.1
Given this large and interdependent transatlantic economic relationship it is quite 
natural that trade tensions and disputes arise. However, they account for only 1-2% of 
total trade and investment between the EU and the US. Even though only a small 
amount is affected, some of the conflicts led to a severe strain on the transatlantic rela-
tionship. 
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1  European Commission on Bilateral Trade Relations with the USA of September 2004, available 
on the Internet: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/usa/index_en.htm> 
(visited on 12. May 2004); Hamilton/Quinlan, Partners in Prosperity, 21, 31, 93. 
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B. Transatlantic trade conflicts 
There is a wide range of trade conflicts between the EU and the US which affect 
diverse areas such as agriculture, aircraft industry, services, steel, tax systems and stan-
dards. Gary Hufbauer of the Institute for International Economics and Frederic Neu-
mann of the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies divided these 
conflicts into three categories: they distinguished between market access, industrial 
policy, and ideological cases.2 Although these categories overlap sometimes, they serve 
as a useful distinction for the following analysis. 
I. Market Access Conflicts 
Market access cases comprise traditional “on the border” trade conflicts regarding 
tariffs and quotas, antidumping and countervailing duties, safeguard restrictions, etc. 
Examples for transatlantic disputes about market access are the EU banana regime 
which established preferential treatment for banana producers from ACP (African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific) countries, thereby discriminating against producers from 
Central American countries, US restrictions on steel imports, or the US Byrd 
Amendment which pays the collected antidumping and countervailing duties to the 
injured US companies. 
II. Industrial Policy Conflicts 
Disputes in the industrial policy category deal with non-tariff barriers to trade, 
such as regulatory issues, preferential treatment of domestic industries, competition 
policy, subsidies and support measures. During the previous GATT-Rounds tariffs 
were reduced drastically so that after the Uruguay-Round industrial tariffs in the US 
amounted to 3.1% and in the EU to 2.9%. Consequently, non-tariff barriers to trade 
became increasingly important, e.g. transatlantic industrial policy conflicts concerning 
European shipbuilding subsidies or EU export subsidies under the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP). Also the high-profile conflict about Foreign Sales Corporations 
(FSC), which provided partial tax breaks for foreign export sales subsidiaries, falls into 
this category. The EU regarded these FSC provisions as an illegal export subsidy for 
US multinational companies and challenged them successfully at the WTO in 1999. 
As a successor, the US enacted the “Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act” (ETI) in 
2000, which was again ruled to be incompatible with WTO rules. In the end, the 
WTO authorized the EU to impose sanctions of up to 4 billion dollars against US 
exports – the highest amount ever permitted by the WTO. As the US did not change 
the contested law, the EU started to impose retaliatory tariffs on 5% of the amount 
starting in March 2004, which was supposed to rise every month by 1%. Finally, in 
October 2004 the conflict was partially resolved when both houses of Congress passed 
a bill which repealed the export tax breaks of the FSC/ETI system and reformed US 
                                              
2  Hufbauer/Neumann, SAIS Working Paper Series WP/01/02 (2002), 6 ff. 
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corporate tax law. As a consequence, the EU lifted the sanctions but decided neverthe-
less to check the WTO compliance of the new legislation.3
Another industrial policy conflict which has the potential to severely strain the 
transatlantic relationship at the moment is the conflict about European Airbus subsi-
dies. This dispute has languished for several years, but in October 2004, during the 
presidential election campaign, President Bush requested consultations with the EU in 
the WTO on the massive “unfair” government support to Airbus. In response, the EU 
requested WTO consultations with the US on subsidies granted to Boeing. With the 
reciprocal complaint at the WTO, the US-EU aviation trade dispute threatened to 
escalate. Particularly due to the economic and political importance of the aviation 
industry, the Airbus-Boeing conflict poses the danger of seriously straining the WTO 
and burdening transatlantic relations. Recognizing this, the EU and US agreed in Ja-
nuary 2005 to begin three months of negotiations on eliminating all types of aircraft 
subsidies. In return, both parties agreed not to request a WTO panel. However, the 
talks were suspended in March over the terms of the negotiating agreement so that the 
outcome of the conflict remains unclear. 
III. Ideology Conflicts 
The last category of trade conflicts between the EU and the US involves “ideo-
logical” disputes where also non-trade concerns are involved. These cases deal with 
domestic regulations which were enacted to pursue legitimate national goals such as 
public health, consumer protection, environmental protection, data privacy or food 
safety regulations. In the US, food safety standards are largely regulated on a federal 
level by agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In response to 
the 1990s BSE and food and mouth disease crises, the EU established a Food Safety 
Authority and demanded the establishment of the “precautionary principle”. This has 
subsequently led to conflicts with the US, as food safety regulations can also act as 
non-tariff barriers to trade. Transatlantic conflicts in this area deal with issues such as 
the approval and labeling of genetically modified organisms (GMO), or restrictions 
on US poultry meat imports because of the use of chlorine. 
Another important ideology conflict regarding food safety which has influenced 
the relationship for many years is the hormone beef case. In 1989, the EU imple-
mented a ban on US imports of hormone-fed beef which was declared safe by the 
FDA. The EU justified the ban on the grounds of consumer and health considera-
tions. In 1995 the US took the case to the WTO, which ruled that the ban was not 
consistent with the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement as it lacked 
scientific evidence. Nevertheless, the EU maintained the ban so that the WTO au-
thorized the US to impose retaliatory tariffs on imports from the EU worth 117 mil-
lion dollars. In 2003, the EU passed a new ban, presenting scientific evidence that 
hormone residues were dangerous for human health. Because of the continued use of 
sanctions by the US, the EU initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings in No-
                                              
3  European Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement, Cases involving the EU: WT/DS108 – Tax 
treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ of September 2003, available on the Internet: 
<http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/wtodispute/show.cfm?id=152&code=1> (visited on 10 June 2004). 
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vember 2004. The outcome of this case remains unclear as the US remains doubtful of 
the scientific evidence presented.4
C. Different Ways of Dispute Settlement for Transatlantic Conflicts 
I. Multilateral dispute settlement 
These three categories of trade conflicts between the EU and the US can either be 
solved in the multilateral dispute settlement system of the WTO, or on a bilateral 
level. The WTO dispute settlement understanding (DSU) is one of the most compre-
hensive international treaties in the area of dispute settlement. The former GATT 
dispute settlement system was remarkably strengthened during the Uruguay-Round 
and moved from a more diplomatic approach to a more judicial, legally binding sys-
tem. The DSU still provides for a consultation period; however, if the conflict has not 
been settled after 30 days, the Panel procedure starts automatically. The most impor-
tant change is the automatic adoption of Panel and Appellate Body Reports, which 
can no longer be blocked by the accused party alone. This is a substantial progress 
compared to the GATT system where the decisions had to be made unanimously. As 
such, the accused party had de facto a veto power. 
Nevertheless, there are fundamental problems regarding this “legalistic” dispute 
settlement system. First, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have to rely on existing 
trade rules which are sometimes ambiguous, contradictory and thus open for interpre-
tation. Furthermore, WTO members do not agree on important regulatory subjects 
regarding for example consumer protection, food safety, and environmental protec-
tion.5 Thirdly, some of the efforts at the multilateral level have led to “tit for tat” re-
taliations, which threaten the entire multilateral trading system: in order to strengthen 
the bargaining position in a current trade conflict, a new conflict against the other 
party is brought to the WTO. As such, conflicts can easily lead to new conflicts in 
other areas. Because of these problems, trade conflicts which are referred to the WTO 
can cause trade wars and damage the transatlantic relationship.6 Thus, many observers 
have emphasized the necessity of a greater reliance on a diplomatic approach on a bi-
lateral level between the EU and the US. 
II. Bilateral economic cooperation and dispute settlement 
The increasing number of trade disputes in the 1990s, which could not be solved 
on the multilateral level, and the renewed importance of economic issues in the trans-
atlantic relationship after the end of the Cold War led to the conviction in the US and 
the EU that bilateral conflict solution should be improved. Therefore, both sides 
                                              
4  Pollack, in: Petersmann/Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic Disputes, 65 (75 f.); Ahearn, CRS 
Issue Brief for Congress 2003, 8 ff.; European Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement, EU 
Requests WTO to Confirm that there is no Justification for US/Canada to Continue to Apply 
Sanctions of November 2004, available on the Internet: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/ 
respectrules/dispute/pr081104_en.htm> (visited 10 June 2004). 
5  Barfield, Intereconomics 37 (Nr. 2, 2002), 131 (131 ff.). 
6  Decker/Mildner, DGAP-Analyse (Nr. 3, 2003), 1 (2 f.). 
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started several initiatives to strengthen and institutionalize bilateral economic coopera-
tion and conflict resolution outside the formal dispute settlement system of 
GATT/WTO. As late as June 2001, both sides reaffirmed the importance of bilateral 
solutions in their statement of the Göteborg summit: 
“Consultation, rather than litigation, should be the preferred method 
of managing our disagreements. We are also determined to work to-
gether to explore ways to achieve this objective, including through me-
diation, and to redouble our efforts to find practical and mutually ac-
ceptable solutions to all outstanding trade disputes, in accordance with 
WTO rules.”7
1. Transatlantic Declaration 1990 
The first transatlantic initiative in this context was the Transatlantic Declaration 
which was signed in 1990, and which established the biannual summits between the 
presidents of the US, the European Council and the European Commission. The in-
tention was to establish a new transatlantic structure and new forms of cooperation in 
order to reaffirm the partnership and the common values and goals.8 However, the 
final declaration was less substantial than initially envisioned: the common activities 
listed were little more than the activities pursued at the UN, and the agreed economic 
cooperation was only a continuation of already existing measures. The main im-
provement was the revaluation of the transatlantic relationship. 
The summits between the EU and the US are still alive until today; however they 
were reduced to only one annual meeting. The last summit took place on June 20, 
2005 in Washington, DC, where the Initiative to Enhance Transatlantic Economic 
Integration and Growth was signed. The main achievement lies in the adoption of the 
“2005 Roadmap for US-EU Regulatory Cooperation”, and the establishment of a US-
EU high-level Regulatory Cooperation Forum with the aim of improving the transat-
lantic regulatory dialogue. In addition, the two sides decided to stimulate open and 
competitive capital markets, to enhance trade, travel and security, and to promote 
energy efficiency.9
2. New Transatlantic Agenda 1995 
The political and economic cooperation between the EU and the US was further 
strengthened by the “New Transatlantic Agenda” (NTA) and the comprehensive 
“EU-US Joint Action Plan”, which were signed by US President Clinton, Jacques 
Santer, President of the European Commission, and Felipe Gonzalez, Spanish 
                                              
7  Statement of the EU-US Summit in Göteborg of June 2001, available on the Internet: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_01/statement.htm> (visited 12 May 
2004). 
8  Paugam, IFRI Policy Paper (Nr. 2, 2003), 1 (5). 
9  The United States and the European Union Initiative to Enhance Transatlantic Economic Inte-
gration and Growth of June 2005, available on the Internet: <www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2005/06/print/20050620-17.html> (visited 21 June 2005). 
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President of the European Council at the summit in Madrid in 1995. The idea 
behind the NTA was to move from a stage of negotiations and consultations to 
cooperative action. The transatlantic relationship was at a low point in 1994/1995, 
and both sides were afraid that without an effort to renew the partnership they would 
grow apart. Tensions had arisen in several areas. Security issues in Bosnia led to 
foreign policy frictions between the Atlantic partners and Europeans felt alienated by 
President Clinton who had negotiated an agreement with APEC in November 1994 
and had proposed a Free Trade Area of the America’s (FTAA) until 2005. Therefore, 
the Transatlantic Agenda was launched to demonstrate a renewed commitment to the 
transatlantic partnership.10
The NTA Action Plan set out four specific policy areas in which joint activities 
should be improved, ranging from foreign policy issues (promoting peace and stabil-
ity, democracy and development around the world), global challenges (combating 
international crime and terrorism, environmental challenges), economic issues (con-
tributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations) to the build-
ing of bridges across the Atlantic (bringing together non-governmental actors from 
both sides of the Atlantic to discuss transatlantic policy questions). The NTA put a 
special emphasis on the economic partnership: both sides pledged to build a “New 
Transatlantic Marketplace” by reducing and eliminating trade and investment barriers 
between them. In particular, non-tariff barriers like regulations, standards and norms, 
as well as testing and certification requirements were addressed. The EU and the US 
specifically stressed the importance of mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for 
testing and certification, and an improved regulatory cooperation in order to prevent 
conflicts in this area.11
The NTA also established a more institutionalized governance structure: a so-
called “Senior Level Group” and a “NTA Task Force” were established to implement 
and monitor the transatlantic agenda. In addition, the Transatlantic Business Dia-
logue (TABD) was created as an integral part of transatlantic cooperation. 
Altogether, the economic pillar of the NTA remained quite vague, as it did not 
require any specific commitments and did not contain a deadline for implementation. 
The most important feature of the NTA Marketplace was the commitment to closer 
regulatory cooperation. With the initiative and support of the TABD an important 
MRA could be signed in 1997, which covered the area of telecommunications equip-
ment, electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft, pharmaceuti-
cals, good manufacturing practices, and medical devices. 
                                              
10  Krenzler/Schomaker, European Foreign Affairs Review, (Nr. 1, 1996), 9 (9 ff.); Frost, Policy Brief 
(Nr. 6 1998), 1 (1 f.); Bergsten, Competitive Liberalization and Global Free Trade: A vision for the 
early 21st century, Institute for International Economics, Working Paper (Nr. 15, 1996), available 
on the Internet: <http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/1996/96-15.htm> (visited 7 July 2004). 
11  The New Transatlantic Agenda of December 1995, available on the Internet: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/new_transatlantic_agenda> (visited 12 May 
2004); Meng, in: Petersmann/Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic Disputes, 507 (517 f.); Kren-
zler/Schomaker, European Foreign Affairs Review, (Nr. 1, 1996), 9 (24). 
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3. Transatlantic Economic Partnership 1998 
Despite the already existing transatlantic framework, the EU and the US re-
mained unable to solve several trade conflicts which remained high on the agenda, 
such as the European banana regime, problems regarding food safety (import ban on 
hormone-fed beef), as well as extraterritorial laws such as the Helms Burton Act and 
the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. In response, the Transatlantic Economic Part-
nership (TEP) was created in May 1998 to further strengthen the economic link and 
to address trade concerns before they developed into conflicts. Originally, Sir Leon 
Britton, Vice President of the European Commission, had proposed an initiative in 
1995 to establish a “New Transatlantic Marketplace Agreement” (NTMA) with the 
US, which aimed at the abolishment of tariffs on industrial goods, and free trade in 
services. When the original plan was rejected, a majority of the initiatives were then 
transformed into the TEP initiative, albeit in a less ambitious way.12
At the beginning of November 1998, both sides adopted a work program, the so-
called “TEP Action Plan”, which identified areas for common activities through mul-
tilateral and bilateral actions. The TEP Action Plan specifically required the EU and 
the US to undertake bilateral consultations in areas such as regulatory processes in 
agriculture (e.g. food safety, plant and animal health, biotechnology), intellectual 
property, procurement and competition – major sources for trade frictions. A special 
emphasis was put again on regulatory cooperation: as many trade conflicts arise due to 
different regulatory approaches in the EU and the US, stronger regulatory cooperation 
was seen as a means to prevent disputes at an early stage. This approach was strongly 
supported by the TABD, which was interested in repeating the success of the MRA 
from 1997. 
The TEP Statement and Action Plan also provided a framework for dealing with 
bilateral conflicts through the creation of the “TEP Steering Group”. This group, 
which replaced earlier sub-cabinet structures between the European Commission and 
the US Administration, was assigned the task of managing the transatlantic day-to-day 
trade and investment relations. It was specifically established to: 
• monitor the implementation of the agreements reached under TEP; 
• identify and review cooperative objectives on an ongoing basis; 
• provide a horizontal forum which can receive recommendations made by 
business, environment, consumer and labour dialogues; 
• provide a horizontal forum for bilateral consultation and early warning on 
any matter of trade and investment relevance, with a view to preventing con-
flicts and resolving trade frictions.13 
Additionally, ten TEP specialized working groups were established to assist the 
TEP Steering Group in most of the issues mentioned in the Action Plan, such as the 
TEP working group on technical barriers to trade, on food safety, services, or e-
commerce. The TEP also created additional civil society dialogues in addition to the 
                                              
12  European Commission, The New Transatlantic Marketplace: Communication of Sir Lean Brit-
tan, Mr. Bangemann and Mr. Monti 1998, 2-3; Pollack, in: Petersmann/Pollack (eds.), Transat-
lantic Economic Disputes, 65 (85). 
13  The Transatlantic Economic Partnership: Action Plan of November 1998, available on the Inter-
net: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/usa/1109tep.htm> (visited 15 May 2004). 
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TABD: the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), the Transatlantic Environ-
ment Dialogue (TAED), and the Transatlantic Labour Dialogue (TALD). Further-
more, in 1999 the Transatlantic Legislator’s Dialogue (TLD) was founded. However, 
none of the dialogues were as active as the TABD, and in 2000 the TAED was even 
dissolved due to a lack of funding by the US.14
4. Transatlantic Early Warning System 1999 
On the basis of the previous three agreements, the EU and the US set up a 
“Transatlantic Early Warning Mechanism” at the Bonn Summit in June 1999. The 
aim was to establish principles and guidelines for the identification and prevention of 
possible trade conflicts. This Early Warning System had become necessary as transat-
lantic summits were increasingly dominated by long-standing trade conflicts regarding 
the import of bananas, hormone-fed beef, FSCs, etc. As both sides were afraid that 
these disputes would disrupt the entire transatlantic partnership, as well as undermine 
the credibility of the WTO, they were looking for ways to prevent these conflicts 
through an institutionalized framework. 
The joint US-EU statement laid out a set of principles to ensure this objective: 
first, transparency was seen as the basis for early warning which should be provided for 
by information exchange between the two partners: “Early warning is intended to im-
prove the capacity of each side to take the others side's interests into account at an 
early stage when formulating policy, legislative, or regulatory decisions, without limit-
ing each side's existing decision-making autonomy.”15
Second, each side should ensure that “its internal procedures enable it to detect at 
an early stage trade, other economic, diplomatic, and global issues that have a transat-
lantic dimension, including policy, legislative, or rule-making initiatives.” Potential 
trade and investment problems which were identified should then be reported to the 
TEP Steering Group, while “diplomatic, global or other problems” should be an-
nounced to the NTA Task Force. The two groups should ensure that the items, which 
had the potential to become trade conflicts, were followed up, “notably by assigning 
contact points, facilitating consultations and agreeing on timelines for reporting 
back.”16
The TEP Steering Group and the NTA Task Force should then inform the Sen-
ior Level Group, which has the task to prepare the annual summits between the US 
and the EU. On the basis of the information presented by the two groups, the Senior 
Level Group should define the issues to be put on the agenda of the bilateral summits. 
As such, the work of the TEP Steering Group would be dealt with at the highest level. 
However, this bilateral Early Warning System focuses on the identification of poten-
tial problem areas. It does not force the EU or the US to alter the contested regulation 
or directive in question. Both sides are thus able to point out the potential sources for 
                                              
14  Pollack, in: Petersmann/Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic Disputes, 65 (90). 
15  Joint EU-US Statement on ‘Early Warning’ Mechanism of June 1999, available on the Internet: 
<http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/html/111711.htm> (visited 20 May 2004). 
16  Ibid.; US-EU Summit Outlines Early Warning System, Falls Short on Services, Inside US Trade 
(25.07.1999), 1, 15 ff. 
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conflict; however this does not imply that conflicts will be prevented or solved in the 
future.17
Between 1998 and 2002, the TEP Steering Group dealt with a variety of potential 
and actual trade problems: the EU raised concerns regarding the US Section 201 
Safeguards Investigation on Steel Wire Rod, US Harbor Services Tax/Fee, the Byrd 
Amendment, “Carousel” Legislation or US Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. In return, the 
US raised concerns on the EU Directive on Waste from Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (WEEE), the European ban on tallow/animal feeds (specific risk material), 
Airbus A380 (governmental financial support), Hush kits (EC rules on aircraft noise) 
or poultry exports to the EU.18
In October 2000, the European Commission issued an overview and assessment 
of the actions taken in the various areas of the TEP, the TEP Action Plan, and the 
Early Warning Mechanism. They regarded the overall performance of the TEP Steer-
ing Group as “very satisfactory” concerning the raising of potential trade disputes. 
However, the follow-up and the resolution of conflicts were seen as problematic: 
The early warning mechanism has proven its usefulness as a means to 
flag the existence of potential trade problems before they become trade 
disputes and to bring them, if necessary, to the attention of the Senior 
Level Group (SLG) and Ministers. However, the follow-up to the spe-
cific items raised, and the solution of the problems, have often de-
pended on the nature of the item and the position of each side’s ad-
ministration.19
In its conclusion, the European Commission criticized particularly the lack of po-
litical will on both sides to reconsider their trade policy and existing regulatory barriers 
for the successful prevention of trade conflicts. Other negative points regarding the 
working basis for the TEP Steering Group included: 
• the difficulties to have established regulations and practices on both sides 
changed in order to take into account the other party’s interests and concerns; 
• the difficulties of solving problems caused by the different decision-making 
structures on both sides of the Atlantic; 
• the large number of issues which hinders appropriate focus on priorities; 
• the lack of resources in both administrations devoted to the TEP.20 
                                              
17  Pollack, in: Petersmann/Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic Disputes, 65 (87 f.). 
18  An Illustrative List of Recent Early Warning Items with the US of January 2004 by the European 
Commission, available on the Internet: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/ 
countries/usa/lewi.htm> (visited 16 June 2004); TEP Early Warning Issues from June 1999 until 
March 2002 by the US Trade Representative, available on the Internet: <http://www.ustr.gov/ 
regions/eu-med/westeur/2002-03-TEP-earlywarning.pdf> (visited 16 June 2004). 
19  European Commission, The Transatlantic Economic Partnership Overview and Assessment, DG 
TRADE.E.3 of October 2000, available on the Internet: <http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/ 
html/11172.htm> (visited 10 May 2004). 
20  Ibid. 
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5. Positive Economic Agenda 2002 
Despite the various transatlantic agreements and political declarations, as well as 
the Early Warning System, progress on the solution of trade conflicts remained slow. 
Therefore, at the EU/US summit in Washington, DC, in May 2002, the Positive 
Economic Agenda (PEA) was adopted. Instead of focusing on trade conflicts and 
transatlantic differences, the PEA looked for possible areas of bilateral cooperation to 
foster transatlantic commerce. Thus, the PEA was in part a reaction to the negative 
results of the Early Warning System and the problems of the TEP Steering Group, 
which had already been criticized by the European Commission in its report from 
October 2000. A “PEA Roadmap” was established in December 2002 to define the 
most promising sectors for cooperation. Initial areas included the financial markets 
dialogue, guidelines for regulatory cooperation and transparency, SPS issues, the in-
surance sector, and electronic customs.21 Thus, in contrast to the Early Warning Sys-
tem, the PEA tried to reduce conflicts through closer bilateral cooperation. 
6. The TEP Steering Group Today 
The TEP Steering Group is still active today and confers several times a year – 
mostly by video conference – for a review of central issues in the transatlantic eco-
nomic relationship. On the US side, it is chaired by Assistant US Trade Representa-
tive for Europe & the Mediterranean Catherine Novelli and, on the EU side, by Ian 
Wilkinson, Director for Sectoral Trade Questions and Market Access, Bilateral Trade 
Relations III in the DG Trade of the European Commission. Originally, the TEP 
Steering Group was designed to act as an early warning system for bilateral trade con-
flicts, and to deal with all aspects of trade policy that may escalate in the future. How-
ever, today it is most active with respect to implementing and managing the various 
issues of the Positive Economic Agenda. The TEP Steering Group is the main forum 
for coordinating the EU/US economic relationship, and is promoting bilateral regula-
tory cooperation between the EU and the US. 
Illustrative List of Recent Early Warning Items (last updated 1/2004) 
? US anti-terrorism initiatives, esp. transport security and bio-terrorism prepared-
ness act 
? US Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 
? EC Trade Barrier Investigation regarding mustard 
? US ban on imports of Spanish clementines 
? US anti-dumping and anti-subsidy procedures on uranium 
? Byrd Amendment (concerning US trade defence procedures) 
? US blanket safeguards procedure on imports of steel 
? US ban on imports of EC food and animals (related to foot and mouth disease) 
? US WTO Obligations in several procedures of US Federal Communication 
Commission 
                                              
21  EU and US Agree on Positive Economic Agenda at Summit of May 2002, available on the Inter-
net: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/usa/pr030502.htm> (visited 12 May 2004). 
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? US Hollings Bill (prop. rules on acquisitions of US telecom companies by foreign 
comp.) 
? Trade considerations in US Exon Florio national security procedures 
? US rules of the Securities Exchange Commission (link with US extraterritorial 
sanctions) 
? US proposed rules on tyre certification 
? Renewal of US Iran Libya Sanctions Act 
? US Air XXI rules 
? US Bilateral Investment Treaties with EU accession countries 
? Airbus A380 (governmental financial support) 
? Hush kits (EC rules on aircraft noise) 
? Exports of US Poultry to the EU 
? EU’s Conformity Assessment Agreements with Eastern European Countries  
? EU rules on solid wood packing (parasites) 
? EU proposed tax rules on digital products 
? EU legislation on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, etc. 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/usa/lewi.htm 
D. Assessment of the bilateral conflict solution under the TEP Steering Group 
This leads to the question of how successful bilateral dispute settlement has been 
under the TEP Steering Group in solving various transatlantic trade disputes. One 
way of conflict prevention lies in the early warning function of the TEP Steering 
Group. It is difficult to assess the actual role of this group in solving or preventing 
transatlantic conflicts at an early stage. For example, the published reports of the TEP 
Steering Group only describe in detail the progress on transatlantic mutual recogni-
tion agreements (e.g. about MRAs on marine safety equipment, in the architectural 
and engineering services sector or the insurance sector). Regarding the Early Warning 
System, the latest report published at the Göteborg summit in June 2001 states only: 
“The TEP Steering Group made continued use of the Early Warning 
Mechanism as a tool for providing opportunities for each side to ad-
dress questions and concerns of the other side in a non-contentious 
manner. During this semester, ‘early warning’ discussions contributed 
to the satisfactory resolution of a number of cases.”22
Afterwards no more reports were published in order to ensure the intimacy of the 
intergovernmental discussions according to a senior official of the European Commis-
sion. However, from these few reports it remains unclear whether the early warning 
function was actually used at a stage where legislative or regulatory decisions were 
formulated as laid down in the Early Warning System, or if both sides were only de-
liberating conflicts where regulatory measures had already been established.23
                                              
22  EU-US Summit Göteborg, Report of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership Steering Group of 
June 2001, available on the Internet: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/ 
sum06_01/tepsg.htm> (visited 12 May 2004). 
23  Meng, in: Petersmann/Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic Disputes, 507 (511 f.). 
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The TEP Steering Group also has been active in solving trade disputes after the 
contested regulations became effective; however, the results have been mixed. On the 
one hand, the system was successful in solving conflicts regarding technical regulations 
like in the Hush kits case. Hush kit devices are used on older aircraft to adhere to the 
noise pollution standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
However in 1990, the EU adopted a regulation banning the use of airplane Hush kits 
for environmental and noise reasons. The EU also decided that from March 2002 
onwards, the use of aircraft with Hush kits which were registered in the United States 
and other third countries was forbidden in the EU. In response, the US filed a com-
plaint at the ICAO. Intense bilateral negotiations followed within the framework of 
the TEP Steering Group, which led to a compromise in October 2001. The Hush kits 
case is thus an example for a successful bilateral trade solution.24
Since the adoption of the Positive Economic Agenda in May 2002, the focus of 
the TEP Steering Group has changed. It has since mostly been dealing with the vari-
ous issues of the Positive Economic Agenda. The following results were achieved – 
one year after the PEA became effective: 
• launch of Financial Markets Dialogue and agreement on “timelines” between 
the EU and the US; 
• resumption of exports of Spanish clementines to the US; 
• launch of EU/US regulatory cooperation in four priority areas: cosmetics, 
automobile safety, metrology and nutritional labeling; 
• establishment of a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) on certificates of 
conformity for marine equipment (signed in February 2004); 
• steady progress towards the resumption of US poultry meat exports to the 
EU; 
• successful completion of the exploratory talks designed to begin negotiations 
on the facilitation of trade in organic products.25 
However, despite some successes under the Early Warning System and the Posi-
tive Economic Agenda, the TEP Steering Group was unable to resolve some of the 
long-standing ideology conflicts, as in the case of hormone-fed beef or GMOs. 
However, when asked about the overall efficiency of the TEP Steering Group in 
preventing and solving bilateral trade disputes, a senior official working in the DG 
Trade of the European Commission emphasized that in his view efficiency was not 
the real debate. In many cases, strong industrial interests were behind the trade issues 
concerned, so that it was difficult and sometimes impossible to solve these problems 
through bilateral consultation. Whenever trade problems between the EU and the US 
were not reconcilable they were submitted to the WTO dispute settlement system. In 
his view, issues that were bound to go to the WTO would go to the WTO anyway. 
According to him, the most important function of the TEP Steering Group was the 
fact that it was an indispensable forum where both sides could expose issues that con-
cern them, thus establishing mutual understanding for the views of the other side. 
                                              
24  Pollack, in: Petersmann/Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic Disputes, 65 (74); Testimony of 
David L. Aaron, Undersecretary for International Trade, on Hushkit Rule of September 1999, 
available on the Internet: <http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/hush0913.htm> (visited 12 May 2004). 
25  The Positive Economic Agenda of May 2002, available on the Internet: <http://trade-info.cec.eu. 
int/doclib/html/114066.htm> (visited 12 May 2004). 
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E. Transatlantic conflicts between bilateral and multilateral dispute settlement 
As already mentioned, the EU and the US can choose to resolve their conflicts 
through the legal dispute settlement system of the WTO or through bilateral negotia-
tions. Until today, both are the most frequent users of the WTO dispute settlement 
system: in 2004, the EU listed 27 transatlantic trade disputes which were registered at 
the WTO: 19 cases were launched by the EU against the US, while in eight cases the 
US filed complaints against the EU.26 In many cases both sides did not even try to 
resolve the conflict through bilateral consultations before turning to the WTO. 
There are several reasons for the EU and the US to use the WTO dispute settle-
ment: First, neither side likes to change existing laws and regulations unless they really 
need to. Therefore, the complainant needs the pressure of a Panel or an Appellate 
Body decision before the other party really makes an effort to change. Second, the EU 
and the US will also resort to the WTO when they want a definite interpretation of 
existing trade rules. Thirdly, in some cases one party is simply trying to gain negotiat-
ing leverage to show that the other party is also in violation of WTO rules. An exam-
ple is the FSC case where the US suspected that the EU took the conflict to the WTO 
in 1998 – almost 14 years after the FSC provisions came into effect in 1984 – as a 
reaction to the US challenge of the EU banana regime and the hormone beef case.27
In contrast to the legal system of the WTO, the bilateral negotiations between the 
EU and the US within the TEP Steering Group follow a political approach. However, 
because of the binding character of the dispute settlement system of the WTO, the 
bilateral, more diplomatic, approach has gradually lost its importance, although the 
WTO procedure also provides for bilateral consultations. While the empirics of trans-
atlantic dispute settlement might point in the direction of the WTO system, it is im-
portant to analyze how both sides should ideally handle the different trade conflicts in 
the three categories outlined above: 1) market access, 2) industrial policy, and 3) ide-
ology conflicts. 
I. Market Access Conflicts 
In general, the first category of market access conflicts receives (with the exception 
of agriculture) low publicity and does not really strain US/EU relations. In addition, 
WTO rules in this area are comprehensive and unambiguous. Therefore, these con-
flicts can in most cases successfully be dealt with at WTO level. One example for a 
successful conflict resolution in this area is the dispute about US safeguard measures 
on European steel imports. In March 2002, President Bush issued protective tariffs of 
up to 30% against 15 steel products for three years as a remedy against – in his view – 
unfairly subsidized imports. In response, the EU established a WTO Panel in May 
2002 which decided that the US safeguard measures violated international trade rules, 
as there was no clear evidence that the increased imports had caused serious injury to 
                                              
26  European Commission on WTO Dispute Settlement of March 2003, available on the Internet: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/dispute/index_en.htm> (visited 2 June 
2004). 
27  Meng, in: Petersmann/Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic Disputes, 507 (515 f.); Ahearn, CRS 
Report for Congress 2002, 6. 
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the domestic steel industry; in November 2003 the Appellate Body upheld the deci-
sion. The EU threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs of as much as 30% on goods up 
to 2.2 billion dollars in early December. However, before these tariffs could come into 
effect, President Bush decided to lift the sanctions on steel imports. In this conflict 
WTO rules were clear and unambiguous, and as such helped solve the transatlantic 
trade conflict before it escalated and turned into a trade war. However, the EU and 
the US should be committed to implement the Panel decisions as soon as possible in 
order not to strain the relationship unnecessarily, unlike in the case of the EU banana 
regime (EU) or the Byrd Amendment (US). 
II. Industrial Policy Conflicts 
Disputes in the industrial policy area have become central to transatlantic trade 
conflicts. They affect national policies like competition, subsidies and support meas-
ures, and are thus more difficult to solve than the previous category. Most of the cases 
are not brought to the WTO (with the exception of FSC) because the measures taken 
often may not constitute a definite violation of WTO rules. Another reason is that the 
accused party will be hesitant to change its industrial policy which is part of its domes-
tic policy strategy. If, however, one party is forced to change, it will most likely file a 
complaint against comparable policy measures of the other party at the WTO, which 
could lead to a tit-for-tat development within the multilateral framework.28 This be-
came apparent in the conflict about subsidies for Airbus and Boeing. The US re-
quested a WTO Panel against unfair subsides for Airbus, and the EU countered with 
a case against Boeing. Therefore both sides rightly decided to solve this conflict bilat-
erally to find an extensive and transparent solution of the subsidy issue. Also, as a reac-
tion to the FSC case the US is still considering to implement a Panel procedure 
against various EU tax measures. 
If the WTO is often not the right institution to solve these conflicts, how can 
conflict resolution in this area be strengthened? One way to improve the resolution of 
industrial policy conflicts is through the advancement of unambiguous international 
rules. There are already WTO agreements on technical barriers to trade, subsidies and 
countervailing measures, etc. which were negotiated during the Uruguay Round. 
However, in other areas such as competition policy, investment or government pro-
curement, comprehensive rules are still missing and it is unlikely that the Doha 
Round will strengthen the rules in these areas. On the contrary, the WTO framework 
agreement which was negotiated in Geneva in August 2004 explicitly dropped the 
three Singapore issues concerning “transparency in government procurement”, the 
“relationship between trade and investment”, and the “interaction between trade and 
competition policy”, leaving only “trade facilitation” on the agenda of the Doha 
Round. 
Another very effective way of improving conflict resolution in the industrial policy 
area is through closer bilateral regulatory cooperation. The European Commission 
stressed in this context that “there is a strong link between regulatory cooperation and 
early warning: many trade disputes derive from the fact that different regulatory ap-
                                              
28  Hufbauer/Neumann, SAIS Working Paper Series WP/01/02 (2002), 9. 
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proaches are taken in the EU and the US to the same problem.”29 Therefore the TEP 
Statement and Action Plan, and the Positive Economic Agenda stress the importance 
of regulatory cooperation and mutual recognition agreements as a way to prevent fu-
ture conflicts. The TEP steering group is very active in this area. As a consequence, 
various agreements have been signed between the EU and the US in the field of ma-
rine equipment, metrology, safe harbor privacy principles, veterinary equivalence, cus-
toms cooperation, competition, etc.30
In addition, at the last EU/US summit in Washington, DC, in June 2005, both 
sides adopted the so-called “2005 Roadmap for US-EU Regulatory Cooperation” 
with the aim of further promoting bilateral regulatory cooperation. This roadmap 
establishes a senior-level dialogue on best regulatory policies and practices, encourages 
the identification of resources and mechanisms to support exchanges for US and EU 
experts and the expansion of successful sectoral initiatives. Furthermore a dialogue on 
standard issues is encouraged. The TEP Steering Group is called to assess regularly the 
implementation of these guidelines as well as analyze the progress of regulatory coop-
eration in general.31
With these measures the EU and the US try to enhance bilateral cooperation in 
the field of industrial policy in order to improve the prevention and resolution of 
trade conflicts. So far, transatlantic regulatory cooperation emphasizes the exchange of 
information and early notification of new regulations; yet it does not involve joint 
rulemaking or the need to change rules and regulations which are regarded as trade 
barriers in the transatlantic market. In this context it could be useful, if the early warn-
ing procedure – where the TEP Steering Group is a key agent – could get a more 
binding character, and if both sides could consider giving up some regulatory sover-
eignty in the rule-making process. As such, many conflicts in the field of industrial 
policy could be successfully dealt with on a bilateral level. However, in this context it 
must be stressed that regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US will remain 
difficult as there are substantial differences in the regulatory requirements and ap-
proaches on each side. 
III. Ideology Conflicts 
The last category, concerning ideology conflicts, is the most difficult to solve. Put-
ting these cases, which involve valid national non-trade concerns, to the WTO can 
endanger the multilateral dispute settlement system, especially when the losing party 
cannot comply with the rulings because of widespread public concerns. This can 
clearly be demonstrated in the case of hormone-fed beef, where the EU rather ac-
                                              
29  European Commission, The Transatlantic Economic Partnership Overview and Assessment, DG 
TRADE.E.3 of October 2000, available on the Internet: <http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/ 
html/11172.htm> (visited 10 May 2004). 
30  Outcome of EU US Cooperation of January 2004 by the European Commission, available on the 
Internet: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/usa/outcome.htm> (visited 5 
May 2004). 
31  The United States and the European Union Initiative to Enhance Transatlantic Economic Inte-
gration and Growth of June 2005, available on the Internet: <www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2005/06/print/20050620-17.html> (visited 21 June 2005). 
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cepted sanctions than changed existing rules. The legally correct decision of the WTO 
Appellate Body did not help solve the conflict. Thus, bilateral conflict resolution in 
this sensitive policy area becomes indispensable. 
A case of successful bilateral conflict resolution in this field concerned the protec-
tion of personal data privacy. Underlying this conflict were different views on how to 
protect personal information: while the US approach is characterized by self-
regulation of the US industry, the EU adopted regulations governing the use of pri-
vate data in the public and private sectors. In October 1998, the EU directive “on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free 
Movement of such Data” became effective, which prohibited EU member states to 
allow transfers of personal data of European citizens to countries which were consid-
ered to provide inadequate data protection; this article also applied to the US. There-
fore, the US feared that US subsidiaries in Europe could be restricted in their com-
munication with their parent companies in the US. Furthermore, the EU wanted to 
guarantee its citizens the right to have access to the data collected on them and to have 
an independent arbitrator dealing with conflicts regarding data protection. Although 
the EC directive entered into force in October 1998, the EU did not block any data 
transfers to the US in order to solve the problem through bilateral negotiations, also in 
the framework of the TEP steering group. Finally in March 2000, both sides negoti-
ated an Agreement on Safe Harbour Principles where US companies can certify them-
selves voluntarily if they want to participate and fulfill the European safe data re-
quirements. Through the Safe Harbour Agreement the EU and the US can retain 
their individual approaches to data privacy while US companies who are interested in 
the European market can register to fulfill European requirements.32 Only through 
bilateral negotiations, both sides were able to solve this sensitive data privacy problem. 
However, bilateral negotiations about ideology conflicts do not always lead to the 
desired results, as can be seen in the GMO case: in 1998, the EU established a de 
facto moratorium on the approval of new GMOs in the EU. Following this morato-
rium, the US and the EU started intense bilateral negotiations about the different na-
tional approval procedures within the TEP Steering Group, which led to the creation 
of a TEP Biotech working group and an EU-US Biotechnology Forum. These forums 
provided a useful basis for bilateral consultations; however, the positions of the EU 
and the US remained far apart because they were only willing to offer limited conces-
sions.33 As the talks proceeded for years without any results, the US initiated a WTO 
dispute settlement procedure in May 2003. Although the EU approved a corn variety 
in May 2004, the final WTO ruling on the European approval and labeling system is 
still pending. Thus the conflict remained unresolved, even though both sides tried to 
solve this conflict on a bilateral level. Underlying this specific conflict are again differ-
ent approaches to risk assessment and the role of the state: in general, the EU supports 
a proactive form of consumer protection while the US supports a reactive form of 
consumer protection. Therefore, the US will regard every proactive regulation as a 
trade barrier while the EU will regard a reactive regulation as disrespect for consumer 
                                              
32  Pollack, in: Petersmann/Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic Disputes, 65 (98 ff.); Decker, 
Handelskonflikte, 190 f. 
33  Decker, Handelskonflikte, 155; Pollack, in: Petersmann/Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic 
Disputes, 65 (77, 98 ff.). 
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protection.34 These differences need bilateral negotiations and diplomatic solutions. 
However, the GMO case clearly demonstrates that especially in sensitive conflicts 
where the public is widely opposed the political will is failing to take the concerns of 
the other side into consideration and to solve the conflict diplomatically. Neither the 
EU nor the US at that time were willing to support a bilateral solution, although this 
would have been the most promising way to solve the conflict permanently. Especially 
in highly politicized cases both sides must therefore improve their commitment to 
work bilaterally, as the WTO is the wrong forum for conflict resolution. 
F. Conclusion 
For the past decades, the EU and the US have cut traditional trade barriers like 
tariffs and quotas, leaving divergent domestic regulations as the main dividing line. 
Therefore, in the future, most of the transatlantic trade conflicts will deal with issues 
where national policies like norms and standards, technical regulations or, most im-
portantly, health concerns and consumer and environmental protection clash. Differ-
ent national attitudes and values are at the core of “new” transatlantic trade disputes. 
In these cases, international rules do not provide adequate ways to solve these conflicts 
effectively before they turn into high-profile disputes. It is therefore desirable that 
both sides – with the help of the TEP Steering Group – increasingly search for diplo-
matic solutions in the field of industrial and ideological conflicts, focusing on media-
tion and problem-solving rather than legal accuracy. 
Further improvements of the Early Warning System and bilateral dispute settle-
ment seem to be necessary to achieve this goal, but most importantly more commit-
ment is needed on both sides as the majority of conflicts does not stem from a lack of 
early warning, but from the decision of one side not to take the views and concerns of 
the other side into account, and to pass and maintain the trade-distorting measure in 
question. The crucial point which decides whether the EU and the US will be able to 
prevent or resolve conflicts in the future is therefore the political will: both sides must 
be seriously committed to finding a mutually satisfying compromise in order not to 
disturb the transatlantic relationship. This is particularly important when sensitive 
national issues such as food safety are concerned. The transatlantic partnership cannot 
afford many long-standing conflicts such as the hormone beef or the GMO case. 
The EU and the US together remain the driving force for a system of global eco-
nomic and political governance. Even though major new economic and political play-
ers such as China, Brazil or India have emerged on the global scene, transatlantic co-
operation is still indispensable. Without the joint effort of the EU and the US, major 
economic and political challenges ranging from the successful conclusion of the Doha 
Round to demographic, technological, energy or security issues cannot be dealt with 
successfully. Therefore both sides must work on a strong economic partnership – un-
hampered by trade wars – as the basis for global cooperation. 
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